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Executive Summary
This article presents a stochastic framework to quantify the biometric risk of
an insurance portfolio in solvency regimes such as Solvency II or the Swiss Sol-
vency Test (SST). The main difficulty in this context constitutes in the proper
representation of long term risks in the profit-loss distribution over a one year
horizon. This will be resolved by using least-squares Monte Carlo methods to
quantify the impact of new experience on the annual re-valuation of the port-
folio. Therefore our stochastic model can be seen as an example for an internal
model, as allowed under Solvency II or the SST. Since our model does not rely
upon nested simulations it is computationally fast and easy to implement.
Outline of the article The first Section 1 introduces the notion of insur-
ance risk in the context of an economic balance sheet. Section 2 describes the
stochastic simulation of forward projected paths used to model long-term insur-
ance risks. The subsequent section 3 explains how Least-Squares Monte Carlo
is applied to compute the Solvency Capital Requirement over a one year hori-
zon. Section 4 applies the theoretic framework to a reference mortality portfolio
and compares the stochastic model with the Solvency II standard formula. In
Section 5 we illustrate the impact of a 200-year event on the life expectancy of
the portfolio. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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1 Introduction: measuring risk capital on a one
year horizon
Consider the simplified economic balance sheet1 of an insurer in Table 1. On
the asset side we find the total value of all assets valued mark-to-market, At.
The liability side consists of the own funds, OFt, and the present value of all
liabilities, PVt
2.
Assets Liabilities
OFt
At
PVt
Table 1: The table depicts the simplified balance sheet of an insurer.
We have the natural relation that OFt = At−PVt. Hence, we consider the own
funds as the residual of assets and liabilities. In general we define the risk that
is associated with a random payoff X as the deviation from its expectation, we
write therefore ∆X := X − E [X ]. We emphasize that there might be other
understandings of risk in practice. With this definition we have the relation
∆OFt = ∆At −∆PVt.
Throughout this article we have the relation that ∆OFt = −∆PVt since we are
only interested in biometric risk and as we assume that the asset side is not
subject to biometric risk. In general ∆PVt will be a function of various inputs,
for instance, mortality rates, lapse rates, stock prices and yield curves. Since we
investigate biometric risk we assume inputs which stem from the capital market
side to be deterministic, e.g. we take yield curves as deterministic.
We are interested in the amount of capital the insurer has to hold in order
to guarantee solvency over a one year horizon. As a risk measure, we use the
Value-at-Risk of the own funds subject to a confidence level of 99.5% over a one-
year period. This is in line with Solvency II: the Solvency Capital Requirement
(SCR) is given by SCR = V aR0.005(∆OF1) = V aR0.995(∆PV1). Nevertheless,
the theory developed in this article can be applied to any risk measure that is
a function of the own funds distribution over one year, such as the Tail-value-
at-Risk used for the SST, for example.
2 The Stochastic Risk Model
Stochastic adjustment of projected cash flows In this section we intro-
duce a stochastic model that produces simulated paths for the development of
future cash flows. Without loss of generality we consider individual life (mortal-
ity) business rather than longevity business and consider future mortality and
lapse rates as major risk drivers. For net cash flows of a single portfolio we
1One may think of this as a simplification of the Solvency II balance sheet. However, the
concepts of this article are general and can be applied to any economic solvency regime.
2In Solvency II, the total liability (technical provisions) TPt is the sum of the best estimate
liabilities PVt and a risk margin, thus TPt 6= PVt. Since the risk margin is, by concept, not
at risk over one year, one still has ∆TPt = ∆PVt so that all formulae in this article remain
valid.
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immediately see that certain components are risky whereas others are not, or
rather, not significantly risky. For instance, we may assume the cash flow of
premiums to behave as predicted by the underwriter whereas the projection of
death rates carries uncertainty. To describe this we attribute to each risky part
of the net cash flow an individual factor that adjusts for its risk. If we assume
that the net cash flow which accrues in each year decomposes3 into
NCF (t) = NetPremium(t)−DeathPayments(t),
then the corresponding stochastic model is given by
NCF (t) = V (t) · (NetPremium(t)−AF (t) ·DeathPayments(t))
with a suitably chosen adjustment factor AF . Figure 2 (later in this article)
illustrates sample paths and the corresponding quantiles for the adjustment
factor used to model mortality risk in a reference mortality portfolio. The
process V is an adjustment factor for the portfolio volume. This modification is
necessary as the portfolio volume is now stochastic due to stochastic mortality
rates.
We identify for each adjustment factor various sources of uncertainty: the ad-
justment factor for death payments should capture the risk of mis-estimation of
future mortality trends (trend risk) as well as the risk of short term catastrophic
events (calamity risk). Moreover, when considering a portfolio of insureds, AF
should capture the risk of a mismatch between own portfolio experience and
the overall population (basis risk). In the upcoming Section 4 we assess each of
these risk sources for a reference mortality portfolio.
Computation of solvency capital over a one year period In order to
guarantee solvency of the insurer over a one year horizon, we are interested in
the change of the present value of net cash flows over one year. The present
value of net cash flows is given by PV =
∑T
t=1 δ(t)NCF (t), where δ(t) is the
discount factor for the net cash flow that accrues in period t.
Hence, from the perspective t = 0 we have
∆PV =
T∑
t=1
δ(t)NCF (t)− E
[
T∑
t=1
δ(t)NCF (t)
]
.
In other words, ∆PV is the present value of the difference between the actual
net cash flows and their best estimate which is derived given all information
available at time t = 0. To determine the SCR, we have to compute the re-
valuation of this random variable given the information update in t = 1, i.e.,
after observing the impact of the realization of the risk drivers on the portfolio
3To increase readability, we deduct Expenses, Commissions and Taxes from the premi-
ums a priori.
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of insureds4. This yields the following equation
E
[
∆(PV )
∣∣∣AF (1)]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
δ(t)NCF (t)
∣∣∣AF (1)] − E[ T∑
t=1
δ(t)NCF (t)
]
= δ(1) {NCF (1)− E [NCF (1)]}+ ...(1)
...+
T∑
t=2
δ(t)
{
E
[
NCF (t)
∣∣∣AF (1)]− E [NCF (t)]} .(2)
To keep the notation simple, we do not enumerate explicitly each risk driver
in the conditional expectation, but rather use the symbol AF (1) to denote the
observed impact of all risk drivers. In the upcoming section we present a method
to compute the conditional expectation in equation (2) using a Least-Squares
Monte Carlo (LSMC) approach
3 Computation of solvency capital using least-
square Monte Carlo methods
In the following we present an approach that allows to derive the distribution
of E [∆(PV ) |AF (1)] with Monte Carlo methods. In practice this can be con-
sidered as the valuation update based on the transition from period t = 0 to
period t = 1. We call equation (1) the experience variance and equation (2)
the assumption change. The first term clarifies the variance of the actual net
cash flow in period 1 and its estimate in period 0 that is experienced during the
transition from period 0 to period 1. Furthermore, this update in information
entails that all future net cash flows have to be changed accordingly based on
new assumptions made in period 1, i.e. the conditional expectation in (2) has to
be computed. Note that the assumption change entirely relies on the experience
variance in the previous year and not on any other (external) information. This
means that the portfolio has to be sufficiently large so that one can assign full
credibility to one year portfolio experience.
In his re-valuation process, an actuary would use the information update af-
ter one year for a re-calibration of the biometric assumptions and use them
for an updated forward projection of net cash flows. We omit the intermedi-
ate re-calibration step since we are only interested in the change of the present
value of the updated forward projection after one year. The reader can find
an approach which does incorporate the idea of re-calibration in the context of
longevity risk in [7], [19] and [20]. Bo¨rger et al. [3] are using generalized linear
models for a re-assessment of mortality trend after one year. An alternative
approach constitutes in using replicating portfolios (cf. [16]), or nested simu-
lations (cf. [1]). The LSMC methods in the context of finance date back at
least to Longstaff and Schwarz who used it in 2001 to value American options
[13]. In the context of financial portfolio analysis, LSMC is analyzed in depth
4Of course, this does not imply that the realizations of all risk drivers are observed directly.
Mathematically, one has to account for this by choosing an appropriate filtration of sigma-
algebras.
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by [6]. There are various variants of LSMC methods which are used to deter-
mine the risk associated with insurance portfolios. Current literature mostly
focuses on market risks and treats biometric risks in a simplified way, e.g. using
deterministic stress scenarios: Ho¨rig and Leitschkis [10] introduce a procedure
that combines nested simulations with linear regression. Krah et al. [11] and
Floryszczak et al. [8] focus on deterministic stress scenarios for biometric risks
(e.g. mortality) and model market / credit risk stochastically. Peters et al. [17]
provide a Bayesian framework with a focus on coherent capital allocation that is
compliant with the Swiss Solvency Test. Ha and Bauer [9] frame the estimation
problem via a loss operator that maps future payoffs to the conditional expected
value at the risk horizon to obtain an optimal choice for the basis functions in
the regression. In [9] asset price, short rate and force of mortality are jointly
modelled to price a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit using LSMC.
Our idea is to approximate equation (2) with a multilinear function as
T∑
t=2
δ(t) {E [NCF (t) |AF (1)]− E [NCF (t)]}
≈
∑
i
α∗risk driveri
(
AF risk driveri(1)− 1
)
,
(3)
where riskdriveri constitute various risk drivers affecting the portfolio of in-
sureds, such as the mortality rates for different age groups or lapse rates. Note
that the model needs no intercept, since the biometric assumptions in t = 0 are
best estimates and therefore E [(]AF risk driveri(1)) = 1.
In Equation (3) we postulate that
∑T
t=2 δ(t)(NCF (t)−E [NCF (t)]) equals the
linear function above plus an error term whose conditional expectation vanishes.
In subsequent sections we plot this relationship for two sample portfolios in Fig-
ures 4 and 5. The key idea is to approximate this unconditional random variable
by simulations. We denote the left hand side of (3) by PV (∆NCF (2 : T )) and
run N (say, 100,000) simulations of the risk drivers to compute projected net
cash flows.
Subsequently, we regress the variable
∑T
t=2 δ(t)NCF (t) − E [NCF (t)] on the
(observable impact of the) realizations of the risk drivers of the first year in
order to obtain estimates for the coefficients α∗risk driveri . By virtue of equations
(1), (2) and (3) we arrive at the following approximation
E [∆(PV ) |AF (1)]
≈ δ(1) {NCF (1)− E [NCF (1)]}+
∑
i
α∗risk driveri
(
AF risk driveri(1)− 1
)
(4)
If we insert the simulated values for the risk drivers in the above equation
we obtain the distribution of E [∆(PV ) |AF (1)]. The 99.5 percentile of this
distribution yields the VaR0.995,
VaR0.995
(5)
= q99.5%
(
δ(1) {NCF (1)− E [NCF (1)]}+
∑
i
α∗risk driveri
(
AF risk driveri(1)− 1
))
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Any other quantiles, or functions of quantiles (such as the Expected Shortfall),
can be computed likewise. Additionally, we obtain more than just the risk
distribution: the coefficients α∗risk driveri of the linear regression show us the
impact of each risk driver on an assumption change given a particular biometric
first year realization, cf. Figure 4 later in this text.
4 Calculation of the Solvency Capital Require-
ment of Solvency II
4.1 A short review of the Capital Requirement via the
Standard Formula
One main difference between our presented stochastic model and the standard
formula is that the latter does not simulate paths of a stochastic process but
instead assumes a deterministic stress scenario. We consider the following stress
scenarios that are relevant for mortality business:
Scenario Name Scenario Description Affected Risk Driver
Lapse shock (#1) Lapse shock of 40 % of
underlying portfolio
40 % x SaR (Sum at
Risk) lapse shock in
year one
Lapse increase (#2) 50 % increase in lapse
rates compared to b.e.
over projection period
+ 50 % lapse rates
Lapse decrease (#3) 50 % decrease in lapse
rates compared to b.e.
over projection period
- 50 % lapse rates
Mortality increase (#4) 15 % increase in mor-
tality rates compared
to b.e. over projection
period
+ 15 % mortality
rates
Life catastrophe (#6) Standard Approach
Cat Risk
+1.5 ‰ x SaR one-
year shock
Denote by PV oFPdet the present value of future profits in the deterministic
scenario, i.e. the scenario that relies on the best estimate, and abbreviate by
PV oFPk the present value of future profits from scenario number k. Then
the SCR according to the standard formula, which we denote by VaRSF0.995, is
computed as follows: First we calculate the sub solvency capital requirements
V aR0.995,lapse(SF ) := max(PV oFPdet − PV NCF#1, PV oFPdet − PV NCF#2, . . .
. . . , PV oFPdet − PV NCF#3, 0),
V aR0.995,mortality(SF ) := max(PV oFPdet − PV NCF#4, 0),
V aR0.995,life catastrophe(SF ) := max(PV oFPdet − PV NCF#6, 0).
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And in the second step we aggregate them by means of the square root formula
V aR0.995(SF ) :=
(
V aR20.995,lapse + V aR
2
0.995,mortality + V aR
2
0.995,life catastrophe + . . .
. . .+ 2 ·
1
4
· V aR0.995,mortality · V aR0.995,life catastrophe + . . .
. . .+ 2 ·
1
4
· V aR0.995,lapse · V aR0.995,life catastrophe
) 1
2
The standard formula is intended to compute the Value-at-Risk subject to a level
of 99.5%. Whereas our presented stochastic model can be calibrated to capture
the specific risk profile of a portfolio, the standard formula has to be applied in
the same way regardless of individual aspects such as the size and riskiness of a
portfolio. One immediately recognizes that this lack of discrimination can be a
serious drawback.
4.2 SCR of a sample mortality portfolio
In this section we consider a sample portfolio M which comprises of whole life
insurance contracts - real, not simulated data. We compare the SCR for this
portfolio calculated with the introduced stochastic model and with the standard
formula. The primary focus of this section is on the methodology: the main
steps necessary to build up a stochastic model that can be used with LSMC.
Our parameterisation of the stochastic model is motivated in the text below
and broadly in line with the authors’ own experience. Nevertheless, we need
to stress that our parametrization is only exemplary for a practical comparison
between our stochastic model with a model based on deterministic stresses. In
particular, it should not be seen as a basis for any real risk assessment. We
begin by explaining the specification of the stochastic model for M .
4.2.1 Stochastic risk model for population mortality
We included the following risk drivers in the model: base mortality5, pandemic
mortality and lapse rates. For the considered portfolio base mortality is the
main risk driver6 and therefore receives the main attention7. In order to specify
an adequate model for mortality risk, a Bayesian Lee Carter (BLC) model is
fitted to UK mortality rates from 1956 to 2013; a similar analysis has also been
performed by [15]. The trend risk model is then based on the volatility of the
BLC around its mean, cf. [21] for details, and further smoothing adjustments.
Since none of the two aforementioned papers states the full parameterization of
the BLC model, we have no parameters we can directly compare our calibration
with. However, we see from a study of [4] based on England & Wales (male)
mortality data, that, for the classical Lee Carter model, an increase in mortality
rates of roughly 45% relative to the best estimate over 40 years corresponds to
5Briefly just referred to mortality in the following.
6This will be seen in Figure 4.
7Future lapse rates are simulated using a Brownian motion, pandemic mortality is given
via a Pareto distribution with its parameters chosen such that the 98 % quantile corresponds
to an excess mortality of 0.4 ‰ and the 99.9 % quantile to 5 ‰; this parametrization is
based on a recommendation of the American Society of Actuaries, (cf. [22]). There exist
other recommendations, for instance [14].
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the upper 5% quantile (cf. Figure 3 of [4]). We observe that our parameteriza-
tion is in the same range. Figure 1 shows the sample paths of the adjustment
factor for mortality trend risk and the resulting funnel of doubt: the upper red
line corresponds to the upper 5% quantile and lies at roughly 1.45 after 40 years;
since 1 corresponds to the best estimate, we have an increase of 45%.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Paths of mortality adjustment (population)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Funnel of doubt (population)
Figure 1: The figure on the left depicts 100 sample paths for the mortality
adjustment relative to the best estimate. The figure on the right shows the
corresponding funnel of doubt. The red lines are the estimated 95 % (resp. 5
%) quantiles, the lines in blue the 75 % (resp. 25 %) quantiles. The mean is
plotted in black. This graphic is based on 100,000 simulations.
A first SCR in the stochastic model considering only population
mortality risk. The least-squares Monte Carlo model with above parame-
terization yields an SCR for portfolio M of VaR0.995(M) = $1, 418m. Here
VaR0.995(M) equals the 0.995 quantile of the distribution that is generated by
equation (4) based on the regression performed on the simulated net cash flows
of M .
SCR via the standard formula. The SCR of portfolio M computed with
the standard formula amounts to VaRSF0.995(M) = $4, 426m. This means the
Solvency Capital Requirement computed with the standard formula is more
than three times higher than the capital requirement based on the stochastic
model that allows for individualities of the portfolio M . This difference may be
largely attributed to
1. the fact that the stochastic model so far only considered population mor-
tality risk rather than portfolio mortality, and
2. an implicit assumption on the degree of diversification in the portfolio
that is underlying the standard formula calibration.
We’ll cover both points in the next section.
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4.2.2 Stochastic risk model for portfolio mortality
Even in a large portfolio the insureds will not represent the underlying popula-
tion with respect to age structure, geographic location or socio-economic class.
We defined basis risk as the risk of a mismatch between portfolio and population
mortality. It has been well known for decades that smoking habits significantly
impact mortality rates (cf. [12], for instance), therefore insureds are being dis-
criminated by smoking status: smokers pay higher premiums than non-smokers.
It would be an interesting aspect of its own to analyze which factors that im-
pact future mortality are currently unknown to insurers but might affect insured
portfolios differently than the overall population. For example, let us assume
that higher mobile phone usage triggers a higher risk of developing cancer in
future years. Via adverse portfolio selection our portfolio could contain a higher
ratio of intensive mobile phone users than one finds in the population (this could
also be linked to the socio-economic distribution of our portfolio diverging from
the population). Since mobile phone usage is typically not known to an insurer,
this discrepancy may increase future portfolio mortality while the overall pop-
ulation mortality is significantly less affected.
In order to keep this exercise short we will not analyze unknown drivers of basis
risk but, as a proof of principle, make the assumption that the smoking habits
of our insureds are unknown. This way we can give an assessment of basis risk
that uses generally established and accepted data. Moreover, this is not an
unrealistic assumption in case of a mortality analysis for disability or income
protection business, where smoker information is hardly available, in particular
for older in-force business.
Example for a consideration of basis risk. The ‘00’ series base mortality
tables of CMI (Continuous Mortality Investigation) are based on 1999-2002
experience collected from UK insurance companies and publicly available on
CMI’s website [5]. Since we are considering an in-force portfolio consisting
of whole life insurance policies we are referring to the tables for permanent
assurances with a select duration of two or more years. For males with an age
between 35 and 65 years, smoker mortality is 1.7 to 2.2 times higher than non-
smoker mortality, for females this factor varies from 1.3 to 2.5. In average, the
ratio of smoker to non-smoker mortality is roughly 2 for males as well as females.
Currently, 35% of the UK population are smokers. Given the size of portfolio M,
we may assume that this share ranges from 31% to 39% in our portfolio. Denote
by qp(α) the portfolio mortality given that the fraction of smokers relative to
all insureds is equal to α. The unfavourable case is when α is larger than 35%.
We calibrate the standard deviation of the basis risk component such that
1 + σbasisrisk =
qp(39%)
qp(35%)
.
We refer to M ref as the portfolio M according to this basis risk parameteriza-
tion. In this setup, the LSMC model yields VaR0.995(M
ref) = $2, 388m. Even
though this risk charge is 68% higher than the one computed without basis risk,
this means point 1 mentioned above only partly explains the difference to the
standard formula. Based on an SCR of VaR0.995(M
ref) = $2, 388m, we see that
the SCR computed via the standard formula is still another 85% higher. This
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may be attributed to a large degree due to point 2, as the following example
shows.
Impact of diversification. When we consider a sub-portfolio M sub of M ref ,
basis risk increases since it is more likely that a small portfolio is even less rep-
resented by the overall population than a large portfolio. It is reasonable8 that
the share of smokers in portfolio M sub lies between 27% and 43%. With the
same reasoning as above for portfolio M ref , this increases basis risk and yields
VaR0.995(M
sub) = $382m. The standard formula yields VaRSF0.995(M
sub) =
$397m. Thus we see that for our sub-portfolio, the SCR computed with the
stochastic model is in the same range as the SCR computed via the standard
formula. This indicates that the biometric stresses of the standard formula may
be adequate for an insurance portfolio that is subject to a high basis risk due
to rather low diversification, but seems too conservative for a bigger and well
diversified portfolio such as M ref . Note that a related analysis of [2] produced
similar results.
Finally, both examples show that our stochastic risk model offers enough flexi-
bility to satisfy the needs of a large insurer with a well-diversified portfolio as
well as the needs of a smaller insurer that is subject to a much higher basis risk.
4.2.3 Discussion of the results and properties of the stochastic model
Figure 2 and 3 show sample paths and the funnel of doubt of M ref and M sub
for mortality risk. One immediately sees that the paths in both plots are more
spread out than the population mortality paths in Figure 1, and that the paths
of the sub-portfolio are again significantly more spread out than the one for the
reference portfolio. Consistently to these results, Plat [18] has analyzed basis
risk of two example insurance portfolios with the result that the funnel of doubt
of the medium-sized portfolio significantly exceeds the one of the large portfolio.
8Msub is much smaller than portfolio Mref . For instance, the PVoFP of Msub is equal to
$23.5m, where the PVoFP of M ref is equal to $262.0m
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Figure 2: 100 sample paths for the mortality adjustment and the corresponding
funnel of doubt. The red lines are the estimated 95 % (resp. 5 %) quantiles,
the lines in blue the 75 % (resp. 25 %) quantiles. The mean is plotted in black.
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Figure 3: 100 sample paths for the mortality adjustment and the corresponding
funnel of doubt. The red lines are the estimated 95 % (resp. 5 %) quantiles,
the lines in blue the 75 % (resp. 25 %) quantiles. The mean is plotted in black.
In Figure 4 the risk of the portfolio M is plotted against some of its regres-
sors. One recognizes the negative impact of higher mortality rates on future
profits; this is because an increase in observed mortality rates in the first year
presumably leads to higher payments in the immediate future and, thus, reduces
profits. Moreover, one sees that a higher mortality experience after one year has
as much stronger impact on the assumption change than, for example, a higher
experience in lapse rates. Figure 5 depicts the dependence of the assumption
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change on the two risk drivers mortality and lapse.
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Figure 4: Dependence of the present value of future ∆ net cash flows on the
risk drivers. The red lines show the regression output projected from the three
dimensional hyperplane to the one dimensional line with respect to the level
where the other risk factors are zero. The figure is based on 100,000 simulations.
A note on the R2 of the regression and the linear approximation. In
statistical data analysis, a low R2 shows that the regression model explains
only a fraction of the variability in the data, thus indicating a poor fit of the
model. This then motivates the use of additional regressors or more complex
basis functions. Here the situation is quite different: the low R2 of the least-
squares linear regression is naturally linked to the fact that the net cash flows
are projected over a long time horizon and thus vary considerably. Hence, the
conditional expectation of ∆(PV ) after one year of experience still has a high
standard deviation, since one can explain the outcome of the next (say) 60 years
of future net cash flows based on the observations of a single year only to a small
amount. Longstaff & Schwartz [13] remark this point as well.
Nevertheless, as an additional validation, we included quadratic terms in the
regression model. The result was a not significantly lower VaR0.995, thus it is
not advisable to add these additional terms as this would increase model risk
but not provide a statistically better result.
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Figure 5: Dependence of the present value of future ∆ net cash flows on the two
risk drivers mortality and lapse, including the regression surface. The figure is
based on 100,000 simulations.
5 Plausibility check: re-estimating life expectancy
after one year
In the last section we have seen that the Value-at-Risk of both sample portfolios
computed with the stochastic model is higher than the Value-at-Risk computed
with the standard formula. In this section we want to illustrate this difference
by looking at the impact of both models on the remaining life expectancy of
the portfolio, a quantity that is more illustrative than a capital requirement
measured in US$.
To simplify the analysis we consider aggregated mortality rates of the entire
portfolio. In particular, the is no distinction between gender or age. The for-
ward looking mortality rates q1, q2, . . . , qT for the time horizon [0, T ] can be
interpreted as follows: Provided an insured has survived until period k− 1, the
probability of surviving the time interval (k − 1, k] is 1 − qk. Denote by L the
remaining lifetime of our portfolio from the perspective t = 0; then
L ≥ k with probability (1− q1) · (1− q2) · . . . · (1− qk).
The remaining life expectancy of the portfolio with respect to the time horizon
T amounts to
E := E [L] =
∫ T
0
P(L ≥ t) dt =
T∑
k=1
k∏
j=1
(1− qj).
Life expectancy in portfolio M We have a remaining life expectancy which
is based on the best estimate mortality rates of Eb.e. = 38.7 years. For the
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stress scenario #4 the remaining life expectancy decreases to E#4 = 36.9 years.
This means that under the standard formula a reduction of the remaining life
expectancy of the portfolio by 1.8 years over one year is seen as a 1 in 200 year
event.
In Figure 6 we depict the projected probability that the average insured survives
the next t years for t ∈ [0, T ]. We see that the stress scenario #4 corresponds
quite precisely to the 25 % quantile trajectory.
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Figure 6: This figure depicts the funnel of doubt for the projected surviving
probabilities of portfolio M . The red lines are the estimated 95 % (resp. 5 %)
yearly quantiles, the lines in blue the 75 % (resp. 25 %) yearly quantiles. The
green line depicts the b.e. probabilities and the pink dashed line the probabilities
derived under the standard formula stress scenario #4. The graphic is based on
10,000 simulations.
In the next step we estimate how likely such an adjustment by the actuary is,
given the new information after one year, using the least-squares Monte Carlo
model
E = α+ β AFmortality(1) + z,
where the error term has conditional expectation zero. The regression output
for portfolio M ref is
E
[
E |AFmortality(1)
]
≈ Ê = 39.1− 9.2AFmortality(1),
Given 100,000 simulations, the 0.5% quantile of Ê is 37.7 years, i.e., a 200-year
event would decrease the remaining life expectancy of the portfolio by one year.
The stress scenario #4 postulates a reduction by 1.8 years that, according to
our model, has a probability of near zero.
For the sub-portfolio M sub, the 0.05% quantile of Ê is 37.3 years, i.e., in a 200-
year event one would decrease the remaining life expectancy of the sub-portfolio
by 1.4 years. This clearly stems from the higher basis risk associated with the
smaller and less diversified sub-portfolio. Nevertheless, the stress scenario #4
is still more conservative and has, for the sub-portfolio, a probability of 0.15%
and thus a recurrence period above 200 years.
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6 Conclusion
We presented a stochastic framework to quantify the biometric risk of an in-
surance portfolio that can be used in risk-based solvency regimes. The main
difficulty in this context constitutes in the proper representation of long term
risks in the profit-loss distribution over a one year horizon. Typically, this re-
quires a mathematically involved or computationally intensive nested simulation
approach. In order to resolve this issue, we proposed a least-squares Monte Carlo
model to quantify the impact of new experience on the annual re-valuation of
the portfolio. Besides being computationally fast and easy to implement, our
method shows the contribution of each risk driver to the capital requirement.
Since the stochastic model produces the distribution of own funds over one year,
any risk measure that is a function of the latter can be easily derived: the Value-
at-Risk and Tail-Value-at-Risk used in Solvency II or the Swiss Solvency Test,
respectively, constitute two relevant examples.
After developing the necessary theory, we applied the stochastic model to a
reference mortality portfolio. The stochastic model proves to be flexible enough
to capture the risk inherent in a large and well-diversified portfolio as well as
for a smaller sub-portfolio. Of course, special attention has to be paid to a
careful parameterization that includes the particular features of the portfolio
and adequately reflects mortality risk. The latter has to account for population
mortality risk as well as basis risk, i.e., the risk of insureds mortality deviating
from population mortality in prospective years.
The aforementioned desirable properties make our proposed model suitable for
an internal model under Solvency II. The practical comparison on our reference
portfolio shows that our LSMC model provides differentiated results that may
lead to a lower (or higher) capital requirement compared to a model based
on deterministic stress scenarios like the standard formula. For our reference
portfolio, the discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that the pre-defined
stresses of the standard formula assume a fixed basis risk and thus implicitly a
certain degree of diversification within the portfolio. While this yields similar
results for a smaller sub-portfolio of our reference portfolio, the solvency capital
requirement of the reference portfolio itself is considerably larger according to
the standard formula.
As a further plausibility check we re-estimated life expectancy of our reference
portfolio after one year of additional experience using a linear least-squares
Monte Carlo model. The results show reasonable assumption changes for the
stochastic model and revealed that the standard formula stress has a recurrence
period of well above 200 years for both of our sample portfolios if we condition
on the distribution of our stochastic model.
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